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NOTES 
 
NO PAIN, NO GAIN:  THE CRIMINAL 
ABSENCE OF THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL 
MARKETS THEORY FROM INSIDER 
TRADING SENTENCING 
NICHOLAS P. PELLICANI† 
INTRODUCTION 
Michael Douglas’s notorious Wall Street character Gordon 
Gekko once proclaimed, “I don’t throw darts at a board.  I bet on 
sure things. . . .  Every battle is won before it is ever fought.”1  
Mr. Gekko famously epitomized the greed of 1980s traders 
through his ability to trade stocks based on information he had 
exclusive access to, thereby allowing himself to place bets on 
events that were certain to occur.2  While traders of publicly 
traded securities are presumed to base their decisions on timely 
and accurate information,3 when that information is unknown to 
the public, the resulting gains or avoided losses are not 
legitimate.4  Knowledge of such information provides traders like 
Gekko with an unfair advantage in the fierce battle over profits.  
Known as insider trading, this conduct is contrary to the 
“justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all 
investors . . . have relatively equal access to material 
 
† Editor-in-Chief, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.S., 2004, Boston College. For her insightful guidance, I 
acknowledge and thank Professor Lisa Catalano. I am most especially grateful to my 
wife, Fabiana, my aspiration and inspiration, without whose love, support, and 
carinho this Note would not be possible. 
1 WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1987). 
2 See Tim Arango, Greed Is Bad, Gekko. So Is a Meltdown., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
2009, at C1. 
3 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1993). 
4 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 (2010). 
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information.”5  Arguably, the incentives and opportunities today 
to illegally profit from inside information have never been 
greater.  Take the hedge fund industry and one of its giants, the 
Galleon Group, which had over $7 billion in assets.6  Galleon’s 
CEO, Raj Rajaratnam, who Forbes Magazine labeled as a “Money 
Maverick” despite the difficult economy, attributed his success to 
“frequent visits with companies” and “conversations with execs 
who invest in his fund.”7  Almost simultaneous with these 
accolades came Rajaratnam’s arrest in connection with one of the 
“biggest criminal case[s] involving hedge fund insider trading.”8  
Allegedly, Rajaratnam, along with a network of others, including 
directors at high profile companies such as Intel and McKinsey, 
netted millions in illicit profits by passing inside information 
gleaned from their jobs to trade on publicly traded companies 
such as Google.9   
The prevalence of insider trading at all levels of society is 
also alarming, as evidenced in a recent SEC investigation for 
possible criminal violations of securities laws.  Following up on a 
tip of “suspicious activity,” improprieties, and “trading on non-
public information” it was revealed that the group at issue had 
“no compliance system in place to ensure that its employees did 
not engage in insider trading.”10  The allegations centered not on 
a vast network of executives and directors but on longtime 
employees who were lawyers.11  Their employer—the SEC!12   
To combat this epidemic, regulatory authorities have 
increased enforcement efforts through a variety of measures, 
 
5 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
6 Matthew Miller & Duncan Greenberg, Money Mavericks, FORBES, Oct. 19, 
2009, at 114. 
7 Id. 
8 Walter Hamilton & Martin Zimmerman, COURTS; Hedge Fund Scheme 
Alleged; Authorities Arrest Six Suspected of Extensive Insider Trading After a 
Wiretap Investigation., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, at B1. 
9 See id. 
10 See Bernie Becker, Insider Trading Inquiry Cites Lawyers at S.E.C., N.Y. 
TIMES, May 16, 2009, at B3. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.; see also Brody Mullins, Tom McGinty & Jason Zweig, Congressional 
Staffers Gain From Trading in Stocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2010, at A1 
(highlighting the prevalence and legality of congressional aids trading on the basis of 
inside information about pending legislation, such as tax incentives for renewable 
energy sources).  
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making insider trading a top priority.13  In the Rajaratnam case, 
wiretapping was used for perhaps the first time to detect the 
passing of inside information, which “reflects that the 
government thinks this is serious conduct involving a significant 
amount of money.”14  But with its limited resources, the SEC is 
forced to take creative measures to counteract criticisms of being 
soft on white-collar criminals and Wall Street.15  The SEC’s 
aggressive approach and unfettered power, though, produces far 
more dangerous consequences when it comes to criminal 
prosecutions in which incarceration is at stake, unlike the mere 
threat of monetary damages and a loss of reputation in civil 
suits.  
Criminally, insider trading—that is, trading public securities 
on the basis of inside, undisclosed information—is punished 
according to the gains received by the insider as a result of the 
trading.16  In other words, the greater the gains, the longer the 
sentence.  The potential punishment is high, as the already 
harsh penalties under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 198817 were increased in 2002 to possible 
fines of up to $5 million for individuals and prison sentences of 
up to twenty years.18  Given its only mixed success in prosecuting  
criminal insider trading cases,19 the government has every 
 
13 In 2008, the SEC brought the second-highest number of insider trading cases 
in its history, up more than twenty-five percent from 2007. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 12, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2008.pdf. More recently, the most extensive 
insider trading investigation ever conducted by the SEC has been brought to light, 
covering three years and focusing on the network of information sharing among 
consultants, bankers, traders, and fund managers. See Susan Pulliam et al., U.S. in 
Vast Insider Trading Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2010, at A1.  
14 Hamilton & Zimmerman, supra note 8 (quoting the former head of the 
securities fraud unit in the Manhattan U.S. Attorney’s office). 
15 See HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES ENFORCEMENT 
191 (1981) (noting the criticism of white-collar criminals receiving lesser sentences 
than convicts of common crimes). 
16 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 (2010). 
17 Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered 
subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006)). 
18 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 
19 See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS 
ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 9.4 (2d ed. 2010). The SEC lacks 
criminal jurisdiction over securities violations, so they are brought by the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, although the SEC may transmit evidence to the Department of 
Justice for prosecution. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b). 
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incentive to make examples out of those insiders that it is 
actually able to convict by seeking longer sentences. 
In pursuing longer sentences, however, the SEC has turned 
its back on the rationale and assumptions underlying the basis of 
many securities fraud regulations it previously embraced, a fact 
not gone unnoticed by courts.20  Overall, the SEC and courts have 
generally indicated a desire to enforce securities laws based on 
the premise that in the case of widely traded issuers, the market 
prices of shares are a reflection of all the public information 
regarding those companies.21  Insider trading cases settled on 
plea bargains reflect this economic-reality.22   
In insider trading sentencing though, the SEC has argued to 
the contrary.  Specifically, the SEC has defined “gains” to include 
price changes based on information that the trader did not 
exclusively know about and thus could not have traded illegally 
on.23  If other information of the same nature facilitates the 
stock’s price in that direction, then if even though the trader is 
no longer acting on “inside” information, his punishment will 
continue to increase.  This is inconsistent, however, with what 
makes traders like Gordon Gekko universally despised: the 
benefits derived from trading on undisclosed information.  By 
measuring a trader’s gains without reference to the date when 
the information at issue becomes public, sentences ignore the 
universally accepted relationship between prices and 
information:  In an efficient market, the value of a given piece of 
information is immediately apparent upon its disclosure.24   
 
20 See United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 547 n.11 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The 
Government does not further the goals of sentencing uniformity or fairness 
when . . . the Government persistently adopts aggressive, inconsistent . . . theories of 
loss.”). 
21 See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, 
Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 527, 536 (1990). 
22 See, e.g., Exhibit A to Plea Agreement at 1–2, United States v. Rieker, 284 F. 
Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (No. 01-3913), available at http://news.findlaw.com/ 
legalnews/lit/enron/. 
23 See Brief of Appellee at 18, United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093 (D. Minn. 
2003) (No. 02-3388) (“[I]t is not unreasonable to view all of appellant’s profits as ‘ill 
gotten.’ Absent an opportunity to trade inside information, there is no evidence in 
the record that appellant would ever have purchased the stock.” (quoting SEC v. 
MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 1983)).   
24 See infra Part II.C (outlining the basic principles of the Efficient Capital 
Markets Theory).  
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The Rajaratnam case illustrates the crucial role of the 
sentencing component in insider trading cases.  Given the 
government25 and SEC26 have such strong evidence, convictions 
of most, if not all, involved is likely.27  For those not pleading 
guilty, because of the case’s high profile, the real issue at stake 
will be the theory of calculating the traders’ illegal gains 
advanced by the government, as it is alleged that the profits of 
those charged to date total close to $52 million.28  If the SEC’s 
civil complaint in connection with several of the alleged traders is 
any indication,29 the calculation with the greatest effect will 
likely be pursued.  The complaint treats “illicit profits” as the 
difference between the purchase price and the later sales price, 
with only a passing reference to the duration between the 
corrective disclosure and date of sale.30  If this approach is 
accepted for all defendants, excessively long sentences may 
result. 
This Note argues that, for purposes of criminal insider 
trading sentencing, courts should look to the date that the 
 
25 United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09-CR-1184, 2010 WL 3219340, at *2–4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010). 
26 Amended Complaint at 15–44, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d 
316 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 8811). 
27 See David Glovin, Bob Van Voris & Joshua Gallu, Hedge Fund Managers, 
Traders Charged in Galleon Trading Probe, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 5, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a120BAm_KwvQ&pos=2 
(noting that fourteen had already been charged, and five had pled guilty, to criminal 
insider trading); Susan Pulliam, Insider-Trading Case: Five Cooperating Witnesses 
Propel Federal Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2009, at A11 (identifying five witnesses 
cooperating with prosecutors in the case against Rajaratnam). The first conviction 
reached in connection with the case resulted in a twenty-seven month prision 
sentence to a former partner at the hedge fund New Castle LLC based on his 
$900,000 in illicit proceeds. See Chad Bray, Galleon Figure Gets a 27-Month Prison 
Term, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2010, at B3. However, Raj Rajaratnam has pled not 
guilty, likely going to trial in early 2011. Pulliam et al., supra note 13.  
28 Glovin, Voris & Gallu, supra note 27. 
29 See Complaint at 4–7, SEC v. Cutillo, No. 09 Civ. 9208 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2009).   
30 Id. The complaint alleges that information regarding acquisitions or sales was 
first obtained by a lawyer representing one of the companies and then dispersed to 
up to five traders. Id. at 1, 3–4. For each transaction, the complaint specified the 
date on which the information was passed on to each individual in the chain, the 
date each party purchased their respective securities, and the date on which that 
transaction was publicly announced. Id. at 3–6. Regarding the corrective disclosure 
and subsequent sale of their holding, though, it merely states that “[t]hey sold 
their . . . holdings shortly after the public announcement of the 
proposed . . . acquisition.” Id. at 4–6. 
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information was disclosed to determine the amount of the 
defendant’s gains.  This point in time simultaneously signifies 
the conclusion of the offense and the market’s valuation of the 
information initially traded on.  Part I will discuss the statutory 
prohibition on insider trading and its corresponding sentencing 
formula.  Part II will focus on the current approaches adopted for 
measuring gains of insider trading in criminal sentencing, as 
well as other forms of securities fraud violations.  Part III will 
identify the presence of the Efficient Capital Markets Theory in 
the general framework of insider trading and disclosure 
regulations.  Finally, Part III will advance a solution to 
calculating gains by presuming that in an efficient market, a 
stock’s price reflects the previously undisclosed information upon 
its disclosure and therefore, concludes the accumulation of gains 
for sentencing purposes. 
I. INSIDER TRADING AND CRIMINAL SENTENCES 
A. Insider Trading  
Trading of public securities based on inside, or undisclosed, 
material information, is prohibited by section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which states that it is unlawful 
to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention of such rules and regulations.”31  Though not 
specifically proscribed, insider trading is punished under the 
general anti-fraud provision of Rule 10b-5.32  Rule 10b-5 provides 
for criminal penalties against anyone who willfully violates the 
provisions33 and was adopted to close a perceived loophole in the 
anti-fraud provisions of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
 
31 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). Insider trading cases may also allege violations of 
regulations prohibiting trading on or tipping material, nonpublic information 
concerning tender offers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2010), or mail and wire fraud, 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2011). 
32 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o employ 
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, . . . or [t]o engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. 
Id. 
33 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). Rule 10b-5 also allows private causes of action. Id. § 78t-
1(a). 
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1933,34 which applied only to the “offer or sale” of securities and 
not to their purchase.35  Specifically, the rule was developed in 
response to a report regarding a corporate president who 
purchased shares after misrepresenting to the public that the 
corporation was doing poorly and shortly before the corporation 
announced that its profits had quadrupled.36  In the wake of this 
case, when Rule 10b-5 was presented to the Commission, the 
only needed persuasion was:  “Well, . . . we are against fraud, 
aren’t we?”37 
The initial requirement for the offense of insider trading is a 
defendant’s classification as an “insider,” which is based on a 
duty owed not to trade on the confidential information.  A 
trader’s duty under Rule 10b-5 must be premised on one of two 
theories: classical or misappropriation.  Classical insider trading 
involves a corporate officer trading his own corporation’s 
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information.38  The 
classic insider owes a fiduciary duty to shareholders of the 
company not to trade on nonpublic information and thus does not 
extend to those without a connection to shareholders.39  This duty 
also applies to those who relay information, or “tippers,” to 
another who then trades on it, with the added stipulation that 
“absent some personal gain [to the tipper], there has been no 
breach of duty to stockholders.”40  A duty based on the 
misappropriation theory applies to any person who takes 
“confidential information for securities trading purposes, in 
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information,” not 
necessarily the corporation whose securities are traded.41  Section 
10(b), however, does not apply to all breaches of a fiduciary duty 
 
34 John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 
U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1366 (1981). 
35 15 U.S.C. § 77q; Barry III, supra note 34 (quoting § 77q). 
36 Barry III, supra note 34. 
37 Milton V. Freeman, Speech at the Conference on Codification of the Fed. Sec. 
Laws (Nov. 18–19, 1966), in 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (observation by Milton 
Freeman, one of Rule 10b-5’s drafters, of Sumner Pike, Commission of the SEC, 
which was the lone comment by the SEC on the draft).   
38 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–30 (1980). 
39 See id. at 224, 231–33 (holding that a printer who had deduced inside 
information from documents handled at work without disclosing his knowledge did 
not violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the use of the nonpublic information 
was not fraud since he had no duty to disclose it before trading). 
40 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662–63 (1983). 
41 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
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but only to those that involve “manipulative or deceptive” 
conduct.42  As both forms of liability are based on a “relationship 
of trust and confidence,” insiders are essentially given a choice: 
“abstain or disclose.”43  The rationale for liability premised on a 
duty is: (1) the relationship gives that person access to 
information available “only for a corporate purpose”; and 
(2) based on “the inherent unfairness involved where a party 
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to 
those with whom he is dealing.”44   
In addition to insider and duty requirements, the statutory 
language requires that the fraud be “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any securit[ies]”45 or when “capitalizing on 
such information through securities transactions.”46  A decision to 
“hold” stock based on nonpublic information is not proscribed.47  
Additionally, the purchase or sale must be made “on the basis of 
material, non-public information,” that is, the trader must be 
aware of the information when the transaction was made.48  This 
does not necessarily require that the “use” of the information be 
proven but merely that the trader knowingly possessed the 
information at the time of the trade.49  Finally, the information 
traded on must be material.  “Material information,” for purposes 
of Rule 10b-5, includes any fact that “in reasonable and objective 
contemplation might affect the value of the corporation’s”50 
securities, although trading by insiders can supply “strong 
circumstantial evidence” of the materiality.51  As Rule 10b-5 is 
 
42 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 
(1977) (quoting section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
43 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230, 246. 
44 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). 
45 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
46 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656. 
47 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754–55 (1975); 
Condus v. Howard Sav. Bank, 781 F. Supp. 1052, 1056 (D.N.J. 1992). 
48 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Defenses to Rule 10b5 include trading based on a prior written agreement 
to buy or sell the security or if as part of a plan. See id. § 240.105b-1(c)(1)(i)(A). 
49 See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1993); Selective 
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 73 SEC Docket 3 
(Aug. 15, 2000). 
50 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting List 
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
51 Id. at 852 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 284 
(1966), aff’d in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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based on the justifiable expectation that all “all investors should 
have equal access” to material information,52 criminal liability 
attaches only when the information is nonpublic at the time of 
purchase or sale.53 
Due to their shared required elements, criminal and civil 
insider trading cases can typically be brought on the same set of 
facts.54  Criminal cases are often followed by civil actions, as 
double jeopardy in these circumstances does not apply.55  As 
such, criminal convictions are pursued only when the evidence is 
sufficiently strong56 for higher profile or extreme conduct cases.57  
B. Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Insider Trading 
Federal sentencing determinations for fraud-based securities 
violations, including insider trading, are governed by the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”).58  Although their use is no 
longer mandatory,59 the Guidelines remain heavily relied on by 
judges, with sentences rarely departing too drastically from 
them.60  Judges are now implored to apply a reasonability 
standard, in that a sentence should be “sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary,” to accomplish the goals of sentencing.61   
 
52 Id. at 851. 
53 United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that 
information is public when it is known by the relevant financial community). 
54 See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 19. One difference is that a criminal 
defendant must have acted “knowingly,” as opposed to “recklessly.” 
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006). This heightened mental state merely requires a 
“realization on the defendant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act . . . and that 
the knowingly wrongful act involved a significant risk of effecting the violation that 
occurred.” United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1370 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d, 445 
U.S. 222 (1980) (emphasis added). Criminal actions are not limited by “buyer-seller” 
allegations, as the government merely needs to prove that the defendant engaged in 
a “manipulative or deceptive” practice. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see United States v. 
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981). 
55 See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997). 
56 See United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2005). 
57 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 19 (“Criminal prosecution is generally 
reserved for aggravated cases, chosen in prosecutorial discretion, based on factors 
like severity of violation, number of victims, size of losses, and problems of proof.”). 
58 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2010). 
59 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). 
60 See Press Release, Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: The Impact of United 
States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www. 
usdoj.gov/opa/documents/United_States_v_Booker_Fact_Sheet.pdf (indicating that 
the number of sentences falling within the Guidelines fell a mere 2.8% between 2002 
and 2006). 
61 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2011). 
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Pursuant to the Guidelines, criminal sentence generally are 
based on a combination of: (1) a base level sentence; (2) an 
increase based on the extent of losses or gains caused as a result 
of the offense; and (3) other offense and offender characteristics, 
which may increase or decrease the total sentence.62  The 
calculated base level offense is then translated into the 
appropriate Federal Sentencing Table to produce a range of 
months of incarceration based on the defendant’s criminal 
history.63  For insider trading, the base level sentence is eight.64  
But the amount of computed gains has the potential to 
significantly add to that figure.65   
The central issue at the sentencing phase for insider trading 
is determining the “gain resulting from the offense.”66  The level 
of the total offense rises based on the amount of calculated gains, 
ranging from an increase of two for $5,000 of gains, to an 
increase of thirty for more than $400 million of gains.67  “Gains” 
for insider trading constitutes the value of the defendant’s gains 
and not victim’s losses “[b]ecause the victims and their losses are 
difficult if not impossible to identify.”68  The background to the 
Guidelines defines a “gain” as “the total increase in value 
realized through trading in securities by the defendant and 
persons acting in concert with the defendant or to whom the 
defendant [has] provide[d] inside information.”69  For all offenses, 
relevant conduct for sentencing is based only on those “acts and 
omissions committed . . . that occurred during the commission of 
the offense.”70   
 
 
62 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1. 
63 Id. § 5A. 
64 Id. § 2B1.4. 
65 For example, assuming all other things equal and a first time criminal, the 
base level from a gain of $5,000 results in a sentencing range of zero to six months, 
while a gain of $400 million would lead to a sentencing range of 235 to 293 months. 
See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(P); id. § 5A. 
66 Id. § 2B1.4; see also United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1067 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009). 
67 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4. 
68 Id. § 2B1.4 cmt. background. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1). 
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II. MEASURING GAINS AND LOSSES IN SECURITIES FRAUD 
A. The Current Split of How To Measure Criminal Insider 
Trading Gains  
The controversy over the appropriate calculation of insider 
trading gains for criminal sentencing purposes revolves around 
differing views as to when the offense ceases and in part, around 
the extent to which it should borrow from calculations in other 
securities fraud cases.  Specifically, the distinction between the 
two views is whether a trader’s “gain resulting from the offense” 
consists of the total profits that a trader earned or the specific 
economic benefit the trader derived from the nonpublic 
information.  
 The Court of Appeals first addressed the issue in United 
States v. Mooney.71  The facts of the case can be illustrated by this 
hypothetical:  Trader M worked as an underwriter for a major 
health-care company, U-Care.72  In May, M was exposed to 
confidential information concerning U-Care’s unannounced 
acquisition of a target company.73  On June 1, M purchased 
20,000 shares of U-Care for $10 per share.74  On July 1, the New 
York Times first mentioned the advanced stage of negotiations 
between U-Care and the target, leading to a sharp increase in 
trading volume and an immediate increase in price to $12.75  On 
July 15, U-Care publicly announced its agreement to acquire the 
target.76  On August 1, M sold 10,000 shares of U-Care at $15 per 
share.77  On November 1, M sold the remaining 10,000 shares for 
$20 each.78  
M was found guilty of various violations of mail and 
securities fraud, including four counts of insider trading under 
Rule 10b-5, and M was sentenced based on his gains, held to be 
the total profit earned through selling all his shares or 
$150,000.79  On appeal, M contended that the market would have 
 
71 425 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
72 See id. at 1095. 
73 See id. at 1096. 
74 See id. at 1095–96. 
75 See id. at 1096. 
76 See id. at 1097. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at 1095, 1099–100. For example, the total gains from the shares sold 
on November 1, would be calculated by subtracting the purchase price ($10) from the 
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reasonably absorbed the information concerning the acquisition a 
week after the initial negotiation article and two days after the 
confirmed agreement.80  M argued that the profits he received as 
a result of the appreciation of U-Care between when the market 
would have “absorbed” the information regarding the sale—
approximately August 1—and when he sold his shares in 
November, or $5 per share, were irrelevant.81 
A divided Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant’s “market 
absorption” approach.  Instead, it upheld the district court’s 
sentencing by reading “gain resulting from the offense” pursuant 
to the Guidelines Commentary that defined it as “the total 
increase in value realized through trading in securities by the 
defendant.”82  The court held the word “realized” to mean that a 
defendant’s subsequent sales price must be used for the 
calculation of gains, even if the sale occurs well after the 
disclosure date, as was the case there.83  The court refused to 
employ principles of “loss causation” from civil cases84 by 
concluding it was “the inside trader who chooses the timing of his 
transactions—his purchases as well as his sales.”85  The court 
also found comfort in “a clear and coherent brightline [sic]” for 
sentences by not engaging in “extensive factfinding [sic]” to 
“determine when the market ha[d] absorbed nonpublic 
information.”86 
A far different approach was recommended by the dissent.  
Judge Bright, writing for the dissent, felt that the “gain resulting 
from the deception stops when the deception stops, though there 
may be later gain (or loss) as the stock market gyrates along, 
unmolested by any deception.”87  Judge Bright asserted that the 
deception stops when the “market adjusts to this information,” 
 
sales price ($20), multiplied by the number of shares (10,000), to reach the total 
($100,000). Under the facts of the case, this resulted in a sentencing range of 37 to 
46 months. See id. at 1098. 
80 See id. at 1098–99. 
81 See id. Under the facts of the case, this resulted in a sentencing range of 24 to 
30 months. Id. 
82 Id. at 1099–110 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 cmt. 
background (2010)). 
83 Id. at 1100. 
84 See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
85 Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1099 n.5. 
86 Id. at 1101. 
87 Id. at 1106 (Bright, J., dissenting). 
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and thus later stock price fluctuations are legitimate.88  Since the 
“ups and downs of the stock market are not causative of loss to 
the deceived parties,”89 a sentence should not include “all the 
defendant’s stock gains . . . but only the stock gains ‘resulting 
from the offense.’ ”90  By basing the “sentence on the throw of the 
dice—the ups and downs of the stock market,”91 this approach 
resulted in unequal sentences for equal crimes.92   
The market absorption approach was later endorsed by the 
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Nacchio.93  The facts of the case 
can be illustrated by this hypothetical:  Trader N was CEO of Q-
Com, a publicly traded communications company, and was 
partially compensated through Q-Com stock options.94  N knew 
that Q-Com was relying heavily on a type of nonrecurring 
revenue source to meet its guidance numbers and would likely 
miss its annual projections, information that was not publicly 
known.95  In March, N exercised one million options, each with an 
exercise price of $5, for a cost of $5 million and then sold the 
shares at $10 per share for total proceeds of $10 million, less 
taxes and commissions of $2 million.96  Over the following 
months, the price of Q-Com dropped to $3.97  Despite prior 
disclosures that referenced the issue, Q-Com did not disclose the 
magnitude of their revenue shortfall until August, and in 
September, it issued a press release lowering its revenue targets, 
at which point the stock fell to $2.98 
 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 1108. 
90 Id. at 1105 n.9. 
91 Id. at 1108 n.12. 
92 See id. at 1108. To illustrate his point, Judge Bright presented the “Larry, 
Moe, and Curly” hypothetical, where three traders purchase the same shares, based 
on the same information, at the same time, but sell at various points after disclosure 
of the information—one immediately when the market absorbed the positive 
information, one three months later, and one six months later. Id. at 1107. But each 
sold at different prices due to subsequent market fluctuations, and three different 
sentences resulted. See id. 
93 573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009). 
94 Id. at 1065. 
95 Id. at 1064. 
96 See id. at 1065. 
97 See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 10, United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062 
(10th Cir. 2007) (No. 07-1311) (contending that the entire telecommunications sector 
declined during that period due to projected “adverse economic and demand trends”). 
98 See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1066. 
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At trial, employing the “net profit” approach from Mooney, 
the government argued that N’s gain was the total amount 
received from stock sales, less the exercise price, or $9 million.99  
N argued that the maximum portion of his gains attributable to 
inside information was only $1 million or the effect the 
information, measured by the August and September disclosures, 
had on the price of the stock.100  The district court found N guilty 
on nineteen counts of insider trading and sentenced him based on 
a gain calculation of $7 million or the total proceeds less costs.101   
On appeal, the district court’s calculation was rejected as 
inconsistent with the offense of insider trading.102  According to 
the Tenth Circuit, N’s offense was not the “sale of the shares 
itself, but in the deception intertwined with the sales due to his 
possession of insider knowledge.”103  Therefore, “any gain 
associated with lawful trading,” or trading purely on the basis of 
publicly available information, should not be incorporated into a 
prison sentence.104  As such, “gain[s] attributable to legitimate 
price appreciation and the underlying inherent value of 
the . . . shares” were not to be included in sentencing.105  Since N 
sold the shares based on his inside knowledge of negative 
information concerning the company, he sold at a higher price 
than he would have had it been disclosed.106  It was this 
“artificially high value,” and not the stock’s total value, that was 
illicit and “should be reflected in the gain calculation.”107 
On remand, the district court was advised to apply a civil 
disgorgement theory to establish a “cutoff point for assessing the 
gain of the illegal conduct” as “the point when the information is 
disclosed and absorbed by the market.”108  Since the price of Q-
Com decreased prior to the disclosure relating to the revenue 
 
99 See id. at 1068. Under the facts of the case, this approach resulted in a 
sentencing range of 70 to 87 months. Id. 
100 See id. Under the facts of the case, this resulted in a sentencing range of 41 to 
51 months. Id. 
101 See id. at 1066, 1068–69. Under the facts of the case, this approach resulted 
in a sentencing range of 63 to 78 months, with an actual sentence imposed of 72 
months. Id. at 1069. 
102 See id. at 1071–72. 
103 Id. at 1072. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 1075. 
106 See id. at 1076. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1082. 
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shortfall, this approach “would better capture the increase in 
value received by the defendant due to unlawful trading in 
securities.”109  To accurately measure only “ill-gotten gains,”110 
“factors unrelated to the defendant’s criminally culpable 
conduct,”111 such as “unrelated negative industry developments 
and their impact on the stock price,” were to be excluded.112  The 
court acknowledged that while it may not be entirely possible to 
exclude chance market forces from an insider’s illegal gains, this 
approach narrows “the range of possible extraneous economic 
factors that might influence the gain amount” and therefore, “the 
range of possible sentencing disparities.”113 
B. Causation and Calculations in Other Settings 
The views over gain calculations in criminal insider trading 
sentencing are relatively contrasting, but calculating the impact 
of other forms of securities fraud exhibits a more unified 
approach.  Whether calculating other securities fraud crimes or 
civil insider trading, a pervasive goal of causation emerges that 
reflects an appreciation of how markets operate. 
Awards in the civil context under Rule 10b-5 are supported 
by a combination of theories of restitution, loss of expectancy, 
and damages.114  Damages, or the economic losses attributable to 
a misstatement or omission, are typically based on the “out-of-
pocket” impact to defendants or the “difference between the 
purchase price and the value of the stock at the date of 
purchase.”115  Courts consider this figure to best measure the 
damages “proximately caused by the defendants’ deceit”116  
 
 
 
 
109 Id. at 1085. 
110 Id. at 1084 n.20. 
111 Id. at 1080–81. 
112 Id. at 1085. 
113 Id. at 1086 n.23. 
114 See Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A 
Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 353–54 (1984). 
115 Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976). 
For a discussion of the primary methodologies for calculating out-of-pocket losses, 
see infra notes 202–08 and accompanying text. 
116 Huddleston v. Herman & MacClean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981), 
overruled on other grounds by Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
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because it is based on the reasoning that the higher share price 
paid by victims due to the fraudulent misstatement constitutes 
their losses.117   
In evaluating the true stock price, in the case of publicly 
traded markets, other information aside from that at issue may 
affect a stock’s price.  The connection between price changes and 
fraudulent conduct is embodied in the requirement of loss 
causation.118  Plaintiffs must establish that the fraud caused the 
demonstrable loss because, given the “tangle of factors affecting 
price,” an inflated stock price is not presumptively caused by the 
fraud, even if the subsequent disclosure results in a lower market 
price.119  This is because a “lower price may reflect, not the earlier 
misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, 
changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-
specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately 
or together account for some or all of that lower price.”120  As a 
result, a plaintiff must prove that the market, as reflected by the 
share price, and not just the individual was deceived to recover 
damages.121 
In civil insider trading cases, disgorgement of profits is the 
proper measure of awards.122  Disgorgement defines ill-gotten 
profits as those gained during the time the fraud was in general 
circulation among the investing public,123 though they “need only 
be a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to 
the violation.”124  Damages are generally limited to “only those 
accretions occurring up to a reasonable time after [the harmed 
investor] discovered the truth.”125  The rationale is that, on 
discovery of the truth, an investor “can protect against further  
 
 
 
 
117 See Green, 541 F.2d at 1344. 
118 See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: 
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 904 (1992). 
119 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005). 
120 Id. 
121 See Langevoort, supra note 118. 
122 See SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004). 
123 SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc); see also SEC v. 
Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1995). 
124 SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
125 MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53. 
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damage by replacing the securities and should not be allowed to 
profit from a further appreciation, while being protected against 
depreciation by his right to recover.”126   
In criminal securities fraud cases not involving insider 
trading, sentences are based on victims’ pecuniary losses.127  
Despite various calculations available to measure this,128 all 
strive to determine the extent to which a defendant’s fraud, as 
distinguished from market or other forces, caused shareholders’ 
losses.129  As in civil cases, out-of-pocket damages are the 
preferred method for measuring losses.130  To determine victims’ 
losses, first, the “remaining” value of the securities subjected to 
the fraud is deducted from the purchase price.131  Second, no loss 
can be attributed to the defendant “unless and until the truth is 
subsequently revealed and the price of the stock accordingly 
declines.”132  Third, “the government must prove that the fraud 
inflated the price . . . and that the investors ‘lost’ ” as a result.133  
If the price declined—at least in part—for reasons other than the 
fraud, not all of the decline can be attributed to the defendant.134  
Price movements prior and subsequent to the corrective 
disclosure shed light on determining the requisite causation.135  
 
126 Id. (quoting Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1306 n.27 (2d 
Cir. 1973)). 
127 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii) (2010). 
128 See Kevin P. McCormick, Comment, Untangling the Capricious Effects of 
Market Loss in Securities Fraud Sentencing, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1145, 1164–71 (2008) 
(outlining the differences between the simple rescissory, modified rescissory, market 
capitalization, and out-of-pocket methods). 
129 See United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The District 
Court’s basic failure at least to approximate the amount of the loss caused by the 
fraud without even considering other factors relevant to a decline in . . . share price 
requires a remand to redetermine the amount of the loss . . . .”); United States v. 
Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Losses from causes other than the fraud 
must be excluded from the loss calculation.”). 
130 See United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871–72 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
Rescissory damages are more appropriate where the market value is too difficult to 
ascertain. See id. at 873; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. 
n.3(C)(i). 
131 See United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2008). 
132 United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005). 
133 Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 870 (holding that it is not reasonable to assume a 
stock’s inflated price remains following a negative announcement).  
134 Olis, 429 F.3d at 546. 
135 See United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 720–22 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
where the government alleged the promotion of a “worthless” company, subsequent 
significant increases in the stock price after the disclosure demonstrated the 
contrary); Olis, 429 F.3d at 548 (holding that when most of a price drop occurred 
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Thus, sentences in these criminal securities cases are a function 
of the extent of the defendant’s culpability up until the stock 
price accurately reflects the available information. 
C. The Efficient Capital Markets Theory 
The court in Nacchio advocated the need to base criminal 
sentencing of insider trading on a “thorough analys[is] grounded 
in economic reality.”136  This Note contends that the Efficient 
Capital Markets Theory (“ECMT”) is such an analysis, as it 
provides an explanation of the relationship between the price of a 
publicly traded security and the market.  In essence, the ECMT 
states that “in an efficient market prices ‘fully reflect’ available 
information” regarding a company.137  This proposition was 
originally developed to discount claims that profits in the market 
could be achieved by reacting the quickest to information, since 
all information publicly available is impounded in a stock’s 
price.138  For example, if an investor read a pharmaceutical 
company’s press release immediately upon release that notes 
FDA approval for the company’s drug that cures cancer and then 
immediately called a broker to buy those shares to capitalize on 
the news, it would have already been too late.  The ECMT 
therefore relies on the assumption that what is “actually 
observed” in the market with respect to the price and time of 
securities is synonymous with the “result if everyone knew the 
information.”139 
To reach this conclusion, the ECMT focuses on the 
fundamental relationship between the availability of information 
and stock prices.  “Corporate finance theory holds that the stock 
price of a company reflects the market’s estimation of the 
company’s future cash flows, discounted back to the present at 
 
before the corrective disclosure, attributing the entire stock price decline to the 
defendant overstated his personal criminal culpability). 
136 See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1075 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 54 (2009). 
137 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384 (1970). 
138 See EUGENE F. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE: PORTFOLIO DECISIONS AND 
SECURITIES PRICES 136 (1976) (finding that a market is efficient with respect to a 
given information set if, at a specific point in time, the information that the market 
uses to determine security prices includes all the information available). 
139 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 552, 558 (1984). 
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the company’s cost of capital.”140  In other words, a stock’s 
intrinsic value is the general consensus of the company’s future 
success, with “present or past . . . performance [used] as an 
indicator of . . . future cash flows.”141  To reach this consensus, 
individual market participants form opinions on various pieces 
information, both from a company specific and general market 
condition basis, to determine an individual security’s valuation at 
any given point in time.  According to the ECMT, “on the 
average, competition will cause the full effects of new information 
on intrinsic values to be reflected ‘instantaneously’ in actual 
prices.”142 
The ECMT operates through one of three primary market 
responses to information that represent the extent of a market’s 
efficiency based on the costs and availability of the information 
at issue: weak, strong, and semi-strong markets.143  Weak 
markets are those in which the history of past prices does not 
lead to predictable valuations, minimizing exploitable trading 
opportunities.144  Strong markets are those in which individuals 
“have monopolistic access to . . . information relevant [to] 
price.”145  The most realistic is the semi-strong market,146 which 
assumes that all available public information is fully reflected in 
a security’s market price.147  This price, which represents the 
stock’s intrinsic value, is a product of competing experts 
attempting to interpret and process the same information for 
 
140 Jay W. Eisenhofer, Geoffrey C. Jarvis & James R. Banko, Securities Fraud, 
Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based 
Theory of Loss Causation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1419, 1421 (2004). 
141 Id. at 1442 (emphasis omitted). 
142 Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 
55, 56 (1965), reprinted in RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF 
CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 156, 158 (1980) (emphasis 
omitted). 
143 Fama, supra note 137, at 414. 
144 See Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A 
Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 375–76 (1984); Fama, supra 
note 137, at 383. 
145 Fama, supra note 137, at 383. 
146 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad 
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 
1082–83 (1990) (noting that recent economic research accepts the assumptions of the 
semi-strong form, citing studies measuring the effects of stock prices from stock 
splits, “large block trades . . . by corporate insiders or market professionals,” 
takeover attempts, and Federal Reserve policy changes). 
147 Fama, supra note 137, at 383. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1057 (2010) 
1076 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1057   
their own gain through purchasing or selling shares.148  Both 
“soft information,” such as “forecasts and estimates,” and “hard 
information,” or “known facts,” are relevant in this respect.149 
The achievement of an efficient market requires two market 
mechanisms that are affected by insider trading: incorporating 
information into prices and providing liquidity in trading.150  
Incorporating information into a price requires producing 
information, both firm specific and of the general market, 
verifying the provided information, and processing and 
“analyzing the information.”151  Liquidity in trading is realized 
through sufficient competing participants all seeking to achieve a 
predetermined risk level.152  Today’s competitive market, 
dominated by analyst coverage and professional traders, 
epitomize the “semi-strong” market by effecting a “rapid price 
equilibration” because of the presence of “only a minority of 
knowledgeable traders who control a critical volume of trading 
activity.”153  By taking information accessible to only a few 
traders and rapidly assimilating it into the price, these 
participants transform a limited disclosure into one that can 
safely be considered “public.”154  Efficient markets therefore 
require important current information to be available to all 
participants at low transaction costs and large numbers of 
rational, profit maximizers actively competing to predict future 
market values of individual securities.155   
III. APPLYING THE MARKET EFFICIENCY THEORY TO MEASURE 
INSIDER GAINS 
This Note contends that the ECMT should be used for 
calculating individual gains in the criminal sentencing of insider 
trading.  The utilization of the ECMT in other capacities reveals 
the confidence the SEC and courts have placed in it to explain 
 
148 See Dennis, supra note 144, at 379. 
149 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 561–62. 
150 Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 720 (2006). 
151 Id. at 721. 
152 See id. at 722. 
153 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 569. 
154 Id. 
155 See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 337 (8th ed. 2006); Fama, supra note 137, at 
388. 
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and regulate markets.  In the context of the precise harms 
insider trading causes, cutting off liability immediately on a 
corrective disclosure provides the most rational solution toward a 
sentence consistent with criminal sentencing and economic 
reality.  The effect of this approach is that, in an efficient market, 
an insider’s gain is to be measured from the next closing price of 
the stock following disclosure of the previously confidential 
information. 
A. Legal Recognition of the Efficient Capital Market Theory 
The ECMT has not only heavily influenced economic theory 
but also the legal and regulatory approaches towards prosecuting 
and counteracting securities fraud by providing a structural 
framework of how markets work.156  Generally, because of 
information’s crucial role in properly valuing securities, the 
ECMT has been used to preclude companies and traders from 
engaging in or concealing certain activities and information.157  
As insider trading is one of the restrictions supported by the 
ECMT and presents the same issues common to other ECMT-
based regulations, the extent of any punishment must reflect the 
assumptions employed in these contexts.  
1. The SEC’s Efficient Disclosure System 
Insider trading is, at its core, a crime based on access to 
information.  Since its prohibition is based on the perceived social 
value of providing accurate and full information to the public,158 
the rationale for rules governing disclosures generally should 
correspond to the sentencing of acts that interfere with this 
value.  In its disclosure policies, the SEC has relied on the 
efficiency of markets to disseminate information and translate it 
into accurate valuations of publicly traded securities through a 
complex disclosure system.159  In this sense, the SEC agreed “that 
economists proved the efficient market hypothesis a decade ago  
 
 
156 See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, 
Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985). 
157 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 552. 
158 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006). 
159 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2010) (annual report requirements); id. 
§ 240.13a-13 (quarterly report requirements); id. § 240.15d-11 (current reports 
requirements). 
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and moved on to other topics entirely, so that all that is left is for 
the law to come into conformity with this intellectual 
orthodoxy.”160 
The SEC regulates markets through disclosure rules focused 
on compelling full and prompt information to individuals to 
create a sense of a fair playing field for investors.161  The most 
influential of these rules is Regulation FD, promulgated to 
directly counteract insider trading on the basis of nonpublic or 
selective disclosure.162  Regulation FD prohibits an issuer from 
disclosing “material[,] nonpublic information” to an individual 
without a near simultaneous disclosure of the event to the 
public.163  It complements the prosecution of insider trading 
under Rule 10b-5, as required disclosures under Regulation FD 
are not premised on a “breach of a duty of trust or confidence,”164 
but when it is “reasonably foreseeable that the . . . securities 
[would be traded] on the basis of the information.”165  Therefore, 
so long as an issuer refrains from disclosing the information to 
anyone on the outside, no infraction has occurred.   
The SEC has also realized that while the courts severely 
punish insider trading under anti-fraud provisions, selective 
disclosure can have just as severe and harmful an economic 
impact as nondisclosure.166  The disclosure requirements in this 
regard facilitate efficiency by reducing duplicative costs of 
searching for information by market participants.167  The SEC 
also requires disclosure of the trading activity by insiders168 and 
has identified situations when insiders are never allowed to 
trade, even if they are not in possession of inside information.169   
 
 
160 Langevoort, supra note 21, at 539. 
161 See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) (“There cannot be honest markets 
without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place 
thrive upon mystery and secrecy.”). 
162 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)–(b)(1). 
163 Id. § 243.100(a). 
164 Id. § 240.10b5-1(a). 
165 Id. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv). 
166 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 
7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 
24,599, 73 SEC Docket 3 (Aug. 15, 2000). 
167 Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 150, at 738. 
168 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1)–(2) (2006) (requiring all officers, directors, and 
“beneficial owner[s] of more than 10 percent of any” class of registered equity class 
to file the appropriate notice with the SEC within ten days of acquiring a position). 
169 See, e.g., id. § 78p(b) (short swing profits); id. § 78p(c) (short sales). 
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Thus, market efficiency is achieved here by ensuring that the 
market trades on the same information but without mandating 
disclosure in all cases. 
The ECMT’s view of information also explains the SEC’s 
perception of the impact of disclosures, particularly in rules that 
do not aim to provide all market participants with information, 
but rather, to ensure that the right participants are informed.  
The SEC’s use of integration, or incorporation by reference, 
supports this view by permitting a publicly filed document 
merely to refer to information previously disclosed in certain 
cases instead of repeating the information.170  Such rules were 
explicitly “created ‘in reliance on the efficient market theory,’ ”171 
since the integrated information is regularly being evaluated by 
analysts, yet available to the press and public for free.172  As an 
efficient market will ensure that the disclosure “is adequately 
reflected in the price of a [company’s] outstanding securities,” the 
need for reiterating it has no discernible benefit.173  Certain 
information may also be disseminated through alternative forms 
to Exchange reports, such as press releases and conference calls, 
provided that they “achieve the goal of effecting broad, non-
exclusionary distribution of information to the public.”174  
Overall, the SEC expects that once material information has 
been accurately disseminated into the market in some capacity, 
the market can be relied upon to process it into the security’s 
price. 
2. Judicial Adoption of the ECMT  
Courts have embraced the ECMT to explain how public 
securities markets operate.  Initially, the assumptions 
underlying the ECMT justified prohibiting insider trading, as 
“the fundamental purpose of the [1934 Securities] Act [w]as 
 
170 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(3) (Form S-3). 
171 Langevoort, supra note 118, at 876 (quoting Adoption of Integrated 
Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, Exchange Act Release No. 18, 
524, Investment Company Act Release No. 12,264, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (Mar. 3, 
1982)). 
172 See Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of 
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6235, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 11,327, 20 SEC Docket 1339 (Sept. 2, 1980). 
173 Id. 
174 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, 
Exchange Act. Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 73 
SEC Docket 3 (Aug. 15, 2000); see also Langevoort, supra note 118, at 877. 
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implementing a philosophy of full disclosure.”175  Legislators 
believed that the “free and open market” of information required 
“the exercise of an enlightened judgment as to what constitutes a 
fair price,” but “[i]nsofar as the judgment of either is warped by 
false, inaccurate, or incomplete information regarding the 
corporation, the market price fails to reflect the normal operation 
of the law of supply and demand.”176  The ECMT’s influence on 
punishing security fraud has since developed in three areas of 
securities fraud case law: (1) determining what information the 
public is entitled to know, or materiality;177 (2) presuming that 
the nondisclosure of information impacts stock prices to prove 
reliance;178 and (3) quantifying the value of the undisclosed 
information based on the price movements following a corrective 
disclosure to establish damages.179  
By understanding that prices reflect information through 
market reactions upon their public disclosure,180 fraudulent 
nondisclosure is contingent on the materiality of the information 
at issue.  Material information is that which would be considered 
by a reasonable investor in making an investment decision, in 
that it creates “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the 
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor 
as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”181  The “total mix” includes even uncertain events, and 
therefore, the price of a security reflects disclosure of such 
information as well.182  The recognition that uncertain events also 
impact price—that is, the ECMT’s semi-strong view of markets—
 
175 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting Sante Fe Indus., 
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
176 S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 68 (1934). 
177 See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). 
178 See, e.g., In re Bally Mfg. Sec. Corp. Litig., 141 F.R.D. 262, 269–70 (N.D. Ill. 
1992). 
179 See, e.g., In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608 
(D.N.J. 2005). 
180 See, e.g., Bowe v. Polymedia Corp. (In re Polymedia Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1, 
10 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[A]n efficient market is one in which market price fully reflects 
all publicly available information.”). 
181 TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449. 
182 See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Tex. 
Gulf Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that a stock’s price “will depend at 
any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will 
occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the 
company activity”). 
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was embraced in Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,183 where 
soft information, such as predictions, was material, since prices 
are based on “beliefs about how firms will do tomorrow, not 
because of how they did yesterday.”184  Even if the information is 
false, it nonetheless aids the pricing of stocks because of 
investors’ interest in seeking the truth.185 
As explained by the ECMT’s market price signaling 
mechanism, materiality determinations dictate whether 
information is in fact nonpublic.186  Information becomes “public” 
when “it has been internalized by ‘the market’—i.e., [when] the 
security’s price reflects that information.”187  Once the 
information is reflected in the price, it can no longer be misused, 
because the insider is now on equal footing with the public.188  
The public, therefore, may trade with an insider, even absent 
personal knowledge of the previously undisclosed information, if 
that information finds it way into the marketplace of ideas.189  
Traders in possession of accurate information may serve to 
accurately price a stock even in the face of contradictory 
statements by the issuer.190  Once public, plaintiffs are in effect 
charged with having constructive knowledge of it.191  Therefore,  
 
 
183 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989). 
184 Id. at 514 (discussing the process by which investors collectively evaluate 
information in the context of the safe-harbor provisions for forward looking 
statements under Rule 175(b)). 
185 See id. 
186 See Dennis, supra note 144, at 414–15. 
187 RALPH C. FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON 
INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL 2–9 (2010). 
188 Id. (quoting United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
189 See Dennis, supra note 144, at 419 (“Each market participant need not have 
access to all information. Rather, the court should focus on whether enough traders 
had the information so that the price signalling mechanism revealed the 
information.”). 
190 See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 14–18 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding 
that where analysts disseminated their views of what the correct information 
regarding a company was, false statements by the company were immaterial 
because they were “either irrelevant or already publicly known”); Dennis, supra note 
144, at 414 (“[T]he nearly simultaneous release of the information to several 
securities analysts meant that, under the efficient market theory, any effect of the 
disclosure on the market was rapidly assimilated . . . to the general public.”). 
191 See Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 530 
(7th Cir. 1985) (“The investor cannot ask a court to focus on the lie and ignore the 
remaining pieces of information already available to him (or, in the case of a publicly 
traded security, already available to others and reflected in the price of the 
security).”). 
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liability for insider trading should be foreclosed once the 
information is already public—that is, reflected in the price of the 
stock.192 
The conclusion that stock prices can be trusted to reflect all 
public, material information coalesced in the fraud-on-the-
market theory.  Applicable in recovery of losses lawsuits under 
Rule 10b-5, the theory permits a “person who traded a 
corporation’s shares on a securities exchange after the issuance 
of a materially misleading statement by the corporation [to] 
invoke a rebuttable presumption [of reliance] on the integrity of 
the price set by the market.”193  Reliance is presumed on a 
showing: (1) of a material, public misrepresentation; (2) that the 
“shares were traded in an efficient market”; and (3) that the 
plaintiffs traded shares between the misrepresentation and the 
corrective disclosure.194  The theory is supported by congressional 
intent to “facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of those 
markets” by creating a “free and open public market” in which 
the “price reflects as nearly as possible a just price.”195  Since “the 
price of a company’s stock is determined by the available 
material information regarding the company,” misinformation 
will presumptively affect the price at which others trade.196  
When the misinformation was already incorporated into a price 
though, the presumption may be rebutted, as a partially 
informed market does not mislead investors.197 
Finally, the ECMT has been employed to explain the impact 
of a corrective disclosure for purposes of determining losses 
caused by the defendant.  Despite claiming not to adopt “any 
particular theory of how quickly and completely publicly 
 
192 See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166–67 (2d Cir. 1980). 
193 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226, 243 (1988). 
194 See Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2004). The 
presumption is rebutted by showing that the plaintiff knew the truth or would have 
traded even if the truth had been disclosed. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 
906 (9th Cir. 1975). 
195 Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 (quoting from H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934)). 
196 Id. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
197 See Schneider v. Vennard (In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig.), 886 F.2d 1109, 
1116 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that, although a company made various optimistic, but 
misleading, statements that inflated the stock price, the negative, omitted 
statements, were already priced into the stock due to analyst statements that 
“effectively counter-balance any misleading impression”), overruled on other grounds 
by Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, 551 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2009).  
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available information is reflected in market price,”198 in reality, 
Basic adopted the semi-strong version of the ECMT.199  As 
impersonal markets disseminate information, whether accurate 
or misleading, “in the processed form of a market price,”200 the 
information’s impact is used to calculate out-of-pocket losses.201   
Out-of-pocket losses represent the difference between the 
“price paid by the plaintiff” and the price the stock would have 
been had the misrepresented or omitted information been public, 
or the actual value.202  The actual value is based on either: (1) the 
“constant ribbon” method, which presumes that the change in 
value upon the curative disclosure reflects the amount the stock 
was inflated or deflated by; or (2) the “constant true value” 
method, which states “that the price following the curative 
disclosure was the [actual] value” during the period of 
nondisclosure.203  The “constant ribbon,” otherwise known as the 
“market model,”204 in essence places a value on the omitted or 
misrepresented information and works backward from the date 
of disclosure, establishing a “value line.”205  The value line is 
determined through either an “event study,” which focuses on the 
market’s reaction to the corrective disclosure,206 or a comparable 
 
198 Basic, 485 U.S. at 249 n.28. 
199 See Macey & Miller, supra note 146, at 1077–80 (“Critical to the fraud-on-
the-market theory is the assumption that the market can trade at ‘incorrect’ prices 
due to the ‘artificial’ distortions caused by misstatements or omissions.”); see also 
Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory To Measure Damages 
in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 884–85 (1990). 
200 Basic, 485 U.S. at 244. 
201 See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 885. 
202 See Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 
rev’d on other grounds, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Cornell & Morgan, supra note 
199, at 897. 
203 See Jonathan C. Dickey & Marcia Kramer Mayer, Effect on Rule 10b-5 
Damages of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: A Forward-Looking 
Assessment, 51 BUS. LAW. 1203, 1204 (1996). To illustrate the difference, suppose a 
trader purchases stock at $20, and the price then increases to $25, but then falls to 
$15 upon the corrective disclosure: under the “ribbon” method, the loss would be $10 
(price paid less the drop in stock price); under the “true value” method, the loss 
would be $5 (price paid less the value of the stock with the corrective information). 
See id. 
204 See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 897. 
205 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in 
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 646 (1985). At the date of corrective 
disclosure, the value line and price line are equal, but the lines are divergent from 
the period of the omission or misrepresentation until that time. See Cornell & 
Morgan, supra note 199, at 886. 
206 See United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 867 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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index, “which approximates what the returns on the security 
would have been had the fraud not occurred.”207  Neither 
approach is lenient on defendants, so Congress placed a “cap” on 
damages when basing out-of-pocket losses on the corrective date 
of disclosure, fearing that it “may end up substantially 
overestimating plaintiff’s damages.”208  While the different 
approaches produce different results, these calculations all rely 
on the assumption that the market will immediately incorporate 
the disclosed information into a stock’s price.  The foregoing 
regulatory and judicial implementations of the ECMT 
demonstrate the theory’s ability to address the ill-effects of 
securities fraud and informational disadvantages while 
establishing the parameters for liability in connection with 
undisclosed information.   
B. The Prohibition of Insider Trading To Preserve Market 
Efficiency 
While the sentencing of insider trading must reflect the 
ECMT-based principals embodied in other disclosure and 
securities fraud regulations, it must also measure the impact of 
illegal trading on the market’s efficiency.  As recognized by 
Nacchio, any assessment of appropriate sentencing must begin 
with the nature of the offense that has been committed.209  The 
offense of insider trading can be measured by its impediment on 
an efficiently operating market, since its purpose is to promote 
equal access to public information.210  As such, a return to the 
desired market efficiency represents the conclusion of criminal 
activity.  
1. Insider Trading’s Effect on Efficiency  
 Insider trading is criminalized based on the harm it inflicts 
on securities markets, as opposed to civil actions, where specific 
claims of monetary damages are sought.211  Generally, the stock 
 
207 See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 897. 
208 H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741 
(referring to Rule 21D(e) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2006))). 
209 See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 54 (2009). 
210 See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968). 
211 See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between 
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1808–09 (1992). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1057 (2010) 
2010] NO PAIN, NO GAIN 1085 
market is seen as a safer alternative to owning wealth, since 
individual risk-aversion interferes with overall economic 
efficiency by discouraging otherwise sound economic 
investments.212  In an efficient market, where information is 
automatically disseminated and reflected in a price, individuals 
can more efficiently gather and process information regarding 
specific companies.213  Since the presence of insider trading at 
any given time is by nature unknown, traders are unable to 
accurately account for it in making their investment decisions, 
increasing the risk of ownership.  Public investors will then bear 
the initial loss as a result of any specific insider trading, 
although the ECMT holds that they are able to shift this cost, 
with most eventually falling on the firms.214   
According to the ECMT, the ideal mechanism to attain 
efficient and liquid markets is through “a competitive 
information traders’ market.”215  As opposed to insiders with 
monopolistic access to information, informational traders cannot 
manipulate disclosures as easily, yet can realize economies of 
scale in discovering, “analyzing[,] and pricing general market 
information.”216  When fraud such as insider trading is pervasive 
though, these economic efficiencies cease, thereby increasing the 
cost of gathering information and leading to a decreased number 
of traders.217  Consequently, competition is reduced, and 
remaining investors are left with higher “bid-ask spread[s].”218  
Those who trade with insiders will inevitably lose out, a loss that 
“cannot be diversified away, as all trades are triggered by either 
a price change or the arrival of new information.”219  At the same 
time, trades by insiders will have only a nominal impact on the 
supply of the stock—an increase if the insider is selling, a 
decrease if buying—as their trades are normally insufficient to 
effect prices to reflect all information or signal to other investors 
the nature of the undisclosed information.220   
 
212 See Boyd K. Dyer, Economic Analysis, Insider Trading, and Game Markets, 
1992 UTAH L. REV. 1, 7–9. 
213 See id. at 35. 
214 See id. at 60–62. 
215 Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 150, at 735–36. 
216 See id. at 733–36. 
217 See id. at 775. 
218 See id. 
219 See id. at 726. 
220 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 630. But see infra notes 302–03. 
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Nonetheless, if certain market conditions exist, notably, the 
presence of adequate numbers of information traders, the market 
will be able to reflect the impormation’s value upon 
dissemination.  This occurs for the same reasons that a market is 
unable to price the stock when the information is undisclosed.  
The ECMT posits that the later corrective disclosure should 
allow for “an informed judgment [that] can be made by all 
investors who trade in such markets”221 and consequently, the 
resumption of the market’s functions of evaluating securities 
evaluation and allocating capital.  
2. Insider Trading’s Effect on Market Participants 
The most obvious victims of insider trading are those that 
trade opposite of the insider.  Not only do those investment 
decisions lack all available information, but the trader either 
purchased at an artificially high price—where the insider was 
selling on negative information—or sold at an artificially low 
price—where the insider was buying on positive information.  
These effects, however, should not be overstated.  An insider’s 
nondisclosure fortuitously benefits those who traded with the 
insider during this period.  Further, an insider’s trades may 
imply the direction of the stock were the information disclosed, 
thereby improving the accuracy of the stock’s price.222 
Insider trading also leads to a loss of confidence in the 
markets.  While the legislative history of Rule 10b-5 reflects that 
investor confidence was an important policy protected by insider 
trading laws because of its potential influence on market 
integrity,223 it amounts to nothing more than a fairness issue.224  
Insider trading liability is premised on “an affirmative duty to 
disclose” information or abstain from trading225 that instills the 
market with confidence that trades are made on an equal playing 
 
221 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d 
Cir. 1974). 
222 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 205, at 645. 
223 See 129 CONG. REC. 24,613 (1983) (statement of Rep. Wirth) (“Insider trading 
threatens our capital markets by undermining the public’s expectations of fair and 
honest securities markets where all participants play by the same rules.”). 
224 See In re Faberge, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10,174, 1 SEC Docket 21, 
at 254 (May 25, 1973) (“Few practices, short of manipulation, have as deleterious an 
effect on the investing public’s confidence in corporate institutions and the securities 
markets as the selective disclosure of and misuse of so called inside information, i.e., 
material, non-public information.”). 
225 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980).  
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field.  While a sense of unfairness may persist beyond a 
corrective disclosure, it is not of the nature punishable by law, 
since the duty concludes upon disclosure, and “not every instance 
of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under 
§ 10(b).”226  Further, such abstract harms are too difficult to 
measure to warrant extending the time-frame that a sentence is 
based on.227   
The company whose information is being used by the trader 
to trade on has the strongest interest in preventing insider 
trading.228  The information takes the form of property, which the 
company has a vested right to use for whatever purposes it sees 
fit.229  However, the “self-serving use of a principal’s information 
to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and 
confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that 
information.”230  In addition, insider trading directly increases 
various costs to a company—of reducing risk;231 of using the 
market through reduced economic efficiency;232 and management 
agency costs borne by other market participants that lead to 
discounted prices, resulting in higher costs of capital.233  It is the 
increased cost of capital that is the most dramatic harm felt by 
the company because traders, and not the company itself, are 
able to profit from the information affecting the company.234  
These costs cease to negatively impact a company upon 
disclosure, however, as the cost of capital should reflect the  
 
 
 
 
226 Id. at 232. 
227 See Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate 
Privacy, in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 120, 121 
(1980) (discounting such fairness arguments as “one of those qualities which exist in 
the eye of the beholder and elicit little effort at explanation”). 
228 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 205. Take for instance a broker who 
was known to be investigated for insider trading and actually received phone calls 
from prospective investors inquiring into his services. See Richard L. Stern, The 
Inside Inside Story, FORBES, Mar. 12, 1984, at 62. 
229 See Scott, supra note 227, at 130. 
230 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
231 Dyer, supra note 212, at 63. 
232 Id. (“This cost causes economic inefficiency because some firms—those that 
are sufficiently risk averse—will forego risky business opportunities.”). 
233 Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 150, at 776. 
234 See id. 
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correct information immediately.235  Further, the threat of 
increased costs of capital is only applicable in the case of 
undisclosed positive information.236   
C. Applying the Efficient Capital Market Theory Approach to 
Criminal Sentencing  
In addition to assessing the social harms of insider trading, a 
criminal sentence must reflect the trader’s culpability to ensure 
consistency with the policies of criminal law and sentencing.237  
By definition, one is no longer trading on the basis of undisclosed 
information when the sale follows disclosure, but one is instead 
trading on the basis of all information, which according to the 
ECMT, is reflected in the price at which the sale occurred.  Since 
the trader completes the sale at the same price as the rest of the 
market, only the trader’s gains as defined by the corrective 
disclosure should be considered in sentencing.238   
1. Defining the Prohibited Offense  
Sentences based on insider trading, as with any crime, must 
reflect the nature of the offense.239  The elements of insider 
trading are satisfied when an individual possesses and uses 
nonpublic information in making the securities transaction, but 
the illegal conduct stops when the deceptive action concludes.240  
The focus on the use of undisclosed information is reinforced by 
the ECMT:  A market is efficient, both in terms of its pricing and 
capital allocation functions, if a trader simply “knows” of insider 
information but refrains from dealing in the security.  As such, 
the criminal components of insider trading further demarcate the 
boundaries of liability for sentencing purposes.   
 
235 See id. at 777. 
236 Unlike the non-disclosure of positive information, which precludes the 
company from borrowing money at a more favorable rate, the non-disclosure of 
negative information artificially reduces the cost of capital and therefore, benefits 
the company. See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1076 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009). 
237 See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077. 
238 It should be noted that that the trader’s sale after disclosure is the concern 
for trading on positive information. As exhibited in Nacchio, when trading on 
negative information, the trader likely sold well before the corrective disclosure. 573 
F.3d at 1076. In both cases, the date of disclosure is crucial. 
239 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (West 2011). 
240 United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1106 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(Bright, J., dissenting). 
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From a criminal law perspective, the initial trade based on 
undisclosed information satisfies the actus reas requirement.241  
This act must coincide with the attendant circumstances242—the 
trade occurring while the information remains undisclosed.243  
The action and circumstances are linked temporally by the 
element of causation, as the statute requires the transaction to 
occur “in connection with” a sale or purchase.244  As such, trading 
absent the knowledge of the undisclosed information is not 
criminal.245  Yet this concept has not been consistently applied, as 
the Mooney Court penalized the trader’s “gain[s]” as those 
obtained “through trading” generally—in essence, the gross profit 
the defendant obtained when all was said and done.246  But under 
Mooney’s approach, a trader that purchased shares at a price 
below the sales price earned no “gains,” regardless of whether 
further losses were avoided by selling.  By basing a sentence on 
net profits, and not profits caused by the illegal act, this 
approach blatantly disregards the element of causation.247  
The necessity of a trader’s use of information also sheds light 
on when the offense has concluded.  If a trader—aware of the 
information and already owning shares previously obtained 
legally—merely holds onto his shares based on the inside 
information and sells following disclosure, the trader has not 
committed a crime under Rule 10b-5.248  As the use of inside 
information forms the basis of the insider’s duty to “disclose or 
abstain” from trading,249 there is no duty to abstain from trading 
 
241 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 127 (5th 
ed. 2009) (“The ‘actus reus’ is the physical or external part of the crime . . . .”). 
242 Id. at 147 (“An attendant circumstance is a condition that must be present, in 
conjunction with the prohibited conduct or result, in order to constitute the crime.”). 
243 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2010). 
244 See id. 
245 See SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2004). 
246 See United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 cmt. background (2010)). 
247 See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 54 (2009). To illustrate the flaws in assessing culpability of trading on 
negative information, take two traders with options exercisable at $10: A exercises 
and sells while the stock is selling at $35, making a profit of $25; B waits, and 
exercises and sells at $10, making no profit. When the negative information is then 
disclosed, the price of the stock falls to $5. While B avoided $5 of losses through the 
insider knowledge, under the net profit approach, only A would be punished, because 
B did not earn a “gain.” See id. at 1084. 
248 See id. at 1072. 
249 See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 1998) (“It is the 
insider’s use, not his possession, that gives rise to an informational advantage and 
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immediately upon disclosure.250  The sentence imposed must be 
tied to the “real [criminal] conduct,” and therefore, it must 
disregard profits obtained legally,251 which is when the duty to 
abstain has ended: upon a corrective disclosure.   
Since insider trading sentencing is based on the “gain 
resulting from the offense,”252 and the offense concludes upon 
dissemination, any consideration of post-dissemination gains is 
excessive and unwarranted.  While Mooney was right in noting 
that the Guidelines reject victims’ losses as a metric of 
culpability,253 it failed to realize that it is equally important to 
impose a sentence that ignores subsequent gyrations of the 
market following dissemination.254  The court in Nacchio properly 
understood that “the court’s focus should be on ensuring that the 
gain figure resulting from the offense excludes to the extent 
possible . . . factors unrelated to the defendant’s criminally 
culpable conduct.”255  By suggesting that the cut-off date may 
extend to a reasonable time after disclosure,256 Nacchio’s 
approach does not go far enough in this regard, since moving the 
measurement date forward in time ensures that fewer outside 
factors are priced into a stock’s value for calculation purposes.257   
The criminal law focuses on punishing the defendant.258  The 
ECMT works within the context of criminal liability to determine 
whether an insider’s gains will ultimately be incorporated into a 
punishment.  The proscribed punishment is a contribution of 
retributive—focusing on the perceived severity of the conduct 
 
the requisite intent to defraud.”); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 
1998) (holding “that mere knowing possession—i.e., proof that an insider traded 
while in possession of material nonpublic information—is not a per se violation” of 
Rule 10b-5). 
250 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) (“[F]ull disclosure 
forecloses liability . . . .”). 
251 See Alexandra A.E. Shapiro & Nathan H. Seltzer, Measuring “Gain” Under 
the Insider Trading Sentencing Guideline Based on Culpability for the Deception, 20 
FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 197 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005)). 
252 Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1067. 
253 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 cmt. background (2010). 
254 See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077. 
255 Id. at 1080. 
256 See id. 
257 See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005). 
258 See Mann, supra note 211, at 1808. 
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and the resulting harm259—and utilitarian elements.  A primary 
utilitarian element is deterrence, which must be imposed at the 
most efficient levels, since imprisonment produces a social cost 
not found in the payment of damages.260  The Nacchio Court 
supported the disgorgement approach in part because of its 
ability to deter improper conduct261—yet its approach fails to 
adequately achieve this goal.   
The consequences of criminal securities regulation have 
ineffectively deterred fraudulent conduct.  Because of the 
complex set of outside factors that uniquely affect corporate 
crime and the infrequency of detection, criminal securities 
regulation must strive to punish the immoral conduct at issue.262  
While perhaps not the basis for conviction, retributive 
principles—or the degree of blame an act deserves—therefore, 
limit the extent of the sentence.263  As insider trading is triggered 
by an initial purchase using inside information, culpability is 
inextricably tied to the effects of that inside information and not 
just trading generally.  Therefore, the moral blame of insider 
trading is contingent on and limited to gains from the 
undisclosed information. 
2. Federal Sentencing Guidelines  
The Guidelines mandate that sentences reflect the severity 
of the crime but must not be greater than necessary to comply 
with the Guidelines’ stated policies.264  A sentence based on the 
difference between the purchase and market price upon 
disclosure is justified because it: (1) establishes clear standards 
of punishment; (2) avoids sentencing disparities; and (3) deters 
future criminal conduct.   
First, punishing only according to the corrective disclosure 
ensures that a definite period of imprisonment is produced, a 
 
259 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s Gray Area: The Anomaly 
of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 54 (2009). 
260 See id. at 47–48. 
261 See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1079. 
262 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal 
Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 973–74 (2003). 
263 See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate 
Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 44–45 (1997). 
264 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (West 2011). 
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goal of particular importance in white-collar crime.265  Clear 
standards are achieved by avoiding extensive fact finding, which 
is especially appropriate given the practical considerations at 
sentencing.266  The event study methodology proposed by the 
defendant in Nacchio, although premised on the ECMT,267 fails to 
address these concerns.  The court in Nacchio remanded for a 
determination of when the information had been fully digested by 
the market, “[s]o long as the end date chosen results in a 
‘reasonable approximation’ of illegal profits.”268  According to the 
defendant’s event study, the effect of the disclosures on the 
stock’s price formed the basis of the portion of the proceeds 
attributable to the inside information.269  A determination as to 
when information has been sufficiently “corrected,” however, will 
likely be resolved in the trial court’s finding of guilt270 and 
therefore, provides a clear result.  The potential benefits of event 
studies are also limited.  The impact of institutional traders and 
the increased reliance on electronic dissemination of 
information271 makes it unlikely that more than one day’s worth 
of trading in a liquid market is needed to “absorb” a piece of 
information.272 
Second, and most importantly, this approach “avoid[s] 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated 
 
265 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 22 (1988). 
266 See United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting the “time 
and evidentiary constraints on the sentencing process”); United States v. Bahkit, 
218 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1240 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Most defendants do not have the 
resources to hire an independent expert and the government has similar financial 
constraints.”). 
267 See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 886. 
268 See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1080 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 54 (2009). 
269 See id. at 1068. 
270 See, e.g., id. at 1066 (finding the defendant’s guilt was based on evidence 
indicating that the full extent of the information traded on was nonpublic until a 
later, specific disclosure). 
271 See Use of Electronic Media, Securities Act Release No. 7856, Exchange Act 
Release No. 42,728, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,426, 65 Fed. Reg. 
25,843, at 25,844 (May 4, 2000) (“The increased availability of information through 
the Internet has helped to promote transparency, liquidity and efficiency in our 
capital markets.”). 
272 See, e.g., Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 890 n.23 (“The efficient 
market hypothesis implies that the market price should reflect the information in 
the announcement no later than the close of trading on . . . the day that the Wall 
Street Journal published an article about the press release.”). 
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defendants.”273  The Supreme Court in Booker reiterated the need 
for uniformity of sentences, not only “for those convicted of 
violations of the same statute,” but, “more importantly, of similar 
relationships between sentences and real conduct.”274  As the 
dissent in Mooney illustrated with the “Moe, Larry, and Curly” 
hypothetical, by only using market prices that reflect a security’s 
information at the time of sale, the conduct is divorced from the 
sentence and results in disparate sentences.275  Sentencing 
disparities even arise between traders who profited the same 
during the undisclosed period and whose stocks increased equally 
following disclosure.276  The Guidelines do not distinguish 
between gains through small volume trading on extraordinarily 
significant information that drastically alters the price of the 
security from gains obtained through high volume trading on 
minor pieces of information.  By accounting for profits unrelated 
to the curative disclosure, defendants trading on less significant 
information but a larger number of shares will be punished more 
than those with smaller holdings who trade on more valuable 
information.   
A third policy of the Guidelines is to impose sentences that 
“afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”277  It could be 
argued that applying the ECMT approach to calculate gains 
would invite insider trading because it may result in lower 
sentences.  But, lower sentences would only result if the stock 
price continued in the direction it moved upon disclosure.  If the 
stock price “bounces back” following the initial reaction to the 
curative disclosure—a typical event upon the release of 
significant information—the ECMT approach actually results in 
 
273 United States v. Jackson, 959 F.2d 81, 83 (8th Cir. 1992). 
274 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253–54 (2005). 
275 See supra note 90. 
276 For example, two traders illicitly earn the same gains at the date of 
disclosure. Trader A bought 100 shares of Company X at $9 each, and on disclosure, 
the price increased to $10. Trader B bought 50 shares of Company Y at $8 each, and 
on disclosure, the price increased to $10. Using the date of disclosure as the end 
date, both gained $100 from insider trading and thus would be sentenced equally. If 
both retain their holdings, and over the subsequent year, shares of X and Y increase 
in value equally, say by $1, then under the Mooney net profit method, Trader A will 
be sentenced longer because he realized $50 more in gains than B. 
277 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (West 2011). Deterrence is also a stated policy of 
the SEC in criminalizing insider trading. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 25TH ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION 4 (1959), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1959.pdf. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1057 (2010) 
1094 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1057   
a higher sentence.278  Further, effective deterrence requires not 
just the threat of punishment but a sense of justice because the 
community must consider the punishment.279  This could explain 
why, despite increased prosecution of insider trading, virtually 
no deterrence effect has been observed.280  As one commentator 
has noted, “[h]arsher sentences may sell well in elections, but 
they appear unlikely to have large deterrence benefits.”281  
Punishing for changes in a stock’s value unrelated to the 
disclosure could further erode any stigma associated with the 
offense, whereas “a short but definite period of confinement 
might deter future crime more effectively.”282   
D. Application of the ECMT Approach to Gain Calculations 
This Note proposes calculating gains as the difference 
between the initial transaction—made on the basis of material, 
nonpublic information—and its price concurrent with the 
corrective disclosure.283  At this point, since the ECMT states that 
the price of the stock will immediately reflect the previously 
undisclosed information, any appreciation in price subsequent to 
the initial purchase represents the illicit gains and consequently, 
 
278 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741. 
279 See Lynch, supra note 263, at 47–48 (comparing the moral implications of 
technical and routine trivial white-collar crimes with the stigma associated with 
violating the rules of Prohibition, which ultimately led to a lack of respect of the 
criminal law in general). 
280 Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading 
Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 332–33 (1998) (contending 
that corporate insiders’ continuing ability to make insider trading profits reflects the 
lack of deterrence in the current regulatory scheme because the SEC does not have 
the resources to investigate and follow up on tips, and it is difficult to prove a 
violation through proof of the piece of information the insider traded on). 
281 Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the 
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 688 
(2002). 
282 See Breyer, supra note 265. 
283 This calculation is based on a trader’s gains from positive information. When 
a trader sells on the basis of negative information, the difference between the closing 
prices immediately preceding disclosure and immediately following disclosure is to 
be used. The difference between the two scenarios is that the “buy low” trader’s 
gains involve the purchase price, while the “sell high” trader’s gains do not. The 
primary reason for this distinction is that a “sell high” trader may not have 
purchased the shares illegally and thus only the later illegal sale is relevant. In this 
situation, this Note proposes that an approach comparable to the “constant ribbon” 
method be used, in that the market’s reaction to the information represents the 
trader’s gain or losses avoided. See supra notes 203–06 and accompanying text. 
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dictates the sentence.  Such an approach reflects the nature of 
the prohibited conduct and resulting harms in its economic 
context.   
The suggested use of the ECMT to determine the proper 
measure of gains in insider trading sentencing may not be 
appropriate in all cases, as it requires a sufficiently efficient 
market to begin with and may be overcome with proof to the 
contrary.  First, the security must be traded on a national market 
exchange, with adequate volume.284  Second, the corrective 
information must be adequately disclosed, although this may be 
presumptively established if the stock price has been affected 
and some public disclosure has taken place.285  Such a disclosure 
need only be “in a manner calculated to reach the securities 
market place in general through recognized channels of 
distribution, and public investors must be afforded a reasonable 
waiting period to react to the information.”286  This “reasonable 
waiting period”287 is incorporated by looking at the stock price at 
the next closing price, which reflects both the ECMT as well as 
the practical reality of when information, especially of the 
corrective nature, is disclosed.288 
The rationale for the presumption of a corrective disclosure 
is that the conviction has already established the materiality of 
the information, in that it was initially traded on because it 
would affect the stock price.  Further, strong form efficiency 
indicates that the information has partly been absorbed even 
prior to that disclosure.  Volume and price movements 
themselves send a message to analysts regarding the nature of 
insider information, especially if some analysts can deduce the 
identity of insider traders.289  Therefore, if sufficiently traded and 
adequately disclosed, according to the ECMT, the price at the 
next closing bell represents the value of the stock with that 
 
284 See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on 
the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 912 (1989) (noting the preconditions for 
use of the fraud on the market theory). 
285 See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968). 
286 In re Faberge, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10,174, 1 SEC Docket 21, at 6 
(May 25, 1973). 
287 Id. 
288 See supra notes 271–72 and accompanying text. 
289 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 572–79. One study shows that a 
simple strategy of trading upon 16(a) filings earns excess returns of three to five 
percent. See Fried, supra note 280, at 325 n.87. 
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information.290  Since the trader profited by the value of stock 
with the inside information, the gain has been established, 
regardless of a subsequent sale.  
The analysis used by courts to determine the adequacy of the 
corrective disclosure should remain consistent with those 
principals implicating liability in the first place.  Therefore, a 
“complete” corrective disclosure is not required to assess an 
insider’s gain, as the ECMT indicates that even uncertainty will 
be factored into a stock’s price.291  Market reactions in the 
direction implied by the information may indicate whether an 
adequate corrective disclosure has occurred.292  In the case of a 
clear corrective disclosure directly contradicting or revealing 
what was originally nonpublic, the determination is simple: the 
date of disclosure.  When there is only a partially corrective 
disclosure, a court should consider if the disclosure satisfies the 
“public information” test.293  If so, then the information has been 
reflected in the price, and gains may be measured.  This 
approach avoids the pitfalls of trying to precisely match the 
information traded on with what is later disclosed, otherwise 
known as establishing an “equivalent disclosure.”294  
Additionally, it recognizes that liability attaches to the 
information and not the total effect of an insider’s trades, as the 
materiality of each disclosure is viewed independently.295   
The strict ECMT approach also best furthers the goals of 
causation mandated by Dura Pharmaceuticals and criminal 
sentencing by punishing only those gains caused by the deceptive 
trading.296  Unlike in Mooney, the measure of gains, in the 
 
290 See Dennis, supra note 144, at 419 (“The courts should limit their inquiry to 
whether a particular item of information has, or would have, affected the price of a 
stock.”). 
291 See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting 
that a stock price reflects “a balancing of both the indicated probability that the 
event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of 
the company activity”). 
292 See SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 54–55 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc). 
293 See supra notes 187–90 and accompanying text. 
294 See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 894–97 (discussing the problems 
that arise when, as noted in Basic, the fraud consisted of the non-disclosure of 
merger discussions, but the corrective disclosure was the merger completion). 
295 See United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1157 (10th Cir. 2008) (“If an 
insider trades on the basis of his perception of the net effect of two bits of material 
undisclosed information, he has violated the law in two respects, not none.”), vacated 
in part en banc, 55 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009). 
296 Dura Pharms. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005). 
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context of either positive or negative information, is based on the 
benefit derived from illegally trading and not gross profits.297  
Therefore, even if a trader ended up losing money on the 
transaction, if the information the trader sold on allowed him to 
sell at a higher price than otherwise, the loss avoided is 
dispositive.  Under Nacchio, the stock price for calculating gains 
is “when the information is disclosed and absorbed by the 
market.”298  The proposed ECMT method, on the other hand, uses 
the stock price only upon disclosure.  While the flexible 
“reasonable time” standard in Nacchio is meant to reflect “that 
the price of thinly traded stocks will not adjust as quickly or as 
accurately as the price of stocks such as IBM,” it also 
“lack[s] . . . [any] reference to an adjustment for the movement of 
the market in the interim”299 period between when disclosed and 
absorbed. 
Further, the common methods for determining when 
information has been absorbed have inherent flaws that 
outweigh any potential benefits they may provide.  Comparable 
indexes will automatically attribute any change in price not 
otherwise reflected in the relevant index to the fraud, and 
therefore, if there is other company-specific information of the 
same nature—positive or negative—gains will be overstated.300  
Under the ECMT approach, this other information will be 
excluded to the greatest extent possible by holding that only the 
market reaction upon disclosure constitutes avoided losses.  
Statistical models commonly employed to quantify the “impact” 
of information on stock prices, such as event studies, may 
partially address this problem but fail to account for leakages of 
information.  For example, if investors traded solely based on 
watching the trading activity of known insiders, the impact of the 
corrective disclosure will be mitigated.301  Such studies, when 
used by defendants who are obvious insiders, such as Nacchio, 
will conclude that the market only slightly reacted to the 
corrective disclosure, and thus, the impact of that information 
was minimal, when in fact, the price had already partially 
 
297 United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 2005). 
298 United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1082 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 54 (2009). 
299 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 205, at 646–47. 
300 See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 903. 
301 See id. at 903–05. 
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reflected the information contained in the disclosure.302  If only 
market reactions form the basis of gains, sentences will then be 
understated.  But under the ECMT approach, by factoring in all 
gains derived from positive information subsequent to the initial 
illegal purchase, these leakages are reflected in the sentence so 
that the total benefit derived from the information is applied to 
the sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the ECMT to the calculation of insider trading 
gains for criminal sentencing purposes results in the most 
equitable punishment for the nature of the offense committed.  In 
doing so, it recognizes the arguments regarding the culpability 
and duration of the offense of trading on inside information 
raised in Nacchio but also the practicalities of the sentencing 
process and the need for a clear and coherent punishment 
advocated by Mooney.   
“In the aftermath of the financial crisis,” it is not surprising 
to see “a re-direction of criminal enforcement attention toward 
Wall Street using aggressive methods.”303  Nevertheless, it is 
incumbent on courts to focus on the harms and conduct of insider 
trading when sentencing those found guilty.  As the offense 
revolves around the possession and use of nonpublic information, 
the ECMT supplies a universally recognized explanation of when 
a stock price can be expected to incorporate that piece of 
information.  While the criminalization of insider trading 
remains a vital tool in protecting the operation of and confidence 
in publicly traded securities markets, the extent of the harms 
caused and profits gained through the prohibited act must be 
kept in perspective.  Even on the basis of inside information, 
trading in public markets still involves risk and is always subject 
to unforeseen developments and events.  One of those 
uncertainties, however, should not be whether a stock’s change in 
price, which is unrelated to the information that formed the basis 
of an illegal trade, can affect the time one spends in prison. 
 
302 See id. at 905 n.50. One study found that stock prices of target companies 
were thirty percent higher prior to the initial announcement of the transaction than 
what the market model would have predicted. See Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. 
Poulsen, Stock Trading Before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading 
or Market Anticipation?, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 237 (1989). 
303 Hamilton & Zimmerman, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
